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        ON THE CONCEPTUAL 
    FRAMEWORK FOR COMPARATIVE 
        POLITICAL ANALYSIS 
                    Motomu SAKANO* 
I 
             The Developmentof Comparative Politics 
   After the Second World War, the comparative study of government and 
politics has undergone a methodological revolution. The development of the 
field has been characterized bythe transformation f "comparative government" 
into "comparative politics". The former has been primarily concerned with 
the comparative study of the formal institutions of governments - particularly 
the governments of Western Europe. It has been in this sense not only parochial 
but also static, formalistic and descriptive. It is attempted in the latter to 
compare systematically the political systems of all kinds, using more dynamic, 
empirically interpreted, and truly comparative method of analysis. "From 
being a subject involving the study of `foreign governments' for the better 
understanding of one's own, it became a study of any governments, or aspects 
of them, for the better understanding of politics in general."1) According to 
Roberts' argument, after the Second World War, comparative politics has de-
veloped through the following phases. 
   In the first phase, that is, in the 1950s, "a new self-consciousness about 
strategies and method of comparison"2) appeared. This trend was the outcome 
of the introspection of various authers already in the area of the study of com-
parative government and politics. The earliest of these were Heckscher, 
    * Associate Professor f Politics, Osaka University. 
    1) G.K. Roberts, What is Comparative Politics? 1972, p.12. 
   2) Ibid.
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Macridis, Beer and Ulam.3) "These authers were concerned with the various 
strategies of comparison-area studies, the configurative approach, institutio-
nal and functional comparison, a problem-based orientation - and with various 
methodological problems - conceptualisation, the establishment of agreed 
categories for comparison, validity as a problem, cross-cultural difficulties and the 
availability of date. However, though many of these topics continue to inte-
rest theorists of the comparative method today, there is a distinction between 
the relatively gross formulation of these topics in the 1950s, and the more sophis-
ticated and rigorous consideration given to them in recent years. It has taken 
those fifteen or more years to find out how to ask the important questions so that 
some answers can perhaps be found. "4) 
   The epitome of the works in 1950s was Almond's The Politics of the Deve-
loping Areas (1960), later and more fully in Comparative Politics: A Developmental 
Approach (1966). Since Almond's work in 1960, the second phase of develop-
ment begins. However, the second phase really occurred outside the area of 
comparative politics, at least in so far as the major contributions come in work 
within such areas as political analysis, political sociology, political modernisation 
and even in international politics. This can be described as being the increased 
sophistcation of comparative analysis in terms of conceptualisation, methods, 
models and theories associated with the "behaviouralist revolution". With 
some exceptions ( uch as the work of Almond mentioned earlier), this interest 
in greater rigour and empirical theorising was undertaken for the general purpose 
of refining and improving "political science" rather than as a deliberate contri-
bution to the improvement of comparative politics. Comparative analysis was 
seen as central to the process of political explanation. In improving comparative 
analysis, political science was improved; in developing the concepts, frameworks, 
methods and strategies of political science in particular sub-fields of the disci-
pline, comparison was facilitated. The "spillover" to comparative politics was 
accentuated inasmuch as the practioners of comparative politics laid claim to 
"the comparative method" as part of their specialism.b) 
    3) Heckscher, The Study of Comparative Government and Politics, 1957; R. Macridis, The 
Study of Comparative Government, 1955; S. Beer and A. Ulam (eds.) Patterns of Government, 
1958. 
    4) Roberts, op. cit., pp. 12-3. 
   5) Ibid, p. 13.
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   The first, in importance, contributions to this development are the concep-
tual frameworks of Easton, Almond and Deutsch.s) They made a revolution 
with their explorations of the notion of "system" as the macro-unit for compar-
ative analysis. Adoptting the concept of the political system, the scope of 
comparative analysis was now much wider. The concept permitted not just 
the comparison of societal systems (empires, republics, colonies, federations, 
city-states) but also the incoporation of any political unit that could be defined 
as a differentiated set of interelated components performing the functions of a 
political system (however such functions were defined in particular). The range 
of "the comparative imagination" had increased.') Almond says, "This new 
terminology reflects a new way of looking at political phenomena. It includes 
some new names for old things, and some new terms to refer to activities and 
processes which were not formerly recognized as being parts or aspects of poli-
tics." And he also states, "A political system is a system of action. What this 
means is that the student of political system is conerned with empirically 
observable behavior." Thus, he argues that "the introduction of the system 
concept represents a genuinely important step in the direction of science."s) 
   The second contribution of these American political scientists wasto proffer 
an interrelated set of concepts that could be used for comparative purposes. 
Easton talks of inputs, outputs, demands, gatekeepers, support, stresses, envi-
ronment, feedback and critical ranges; Almond offers a set of input and output 
functions; Deutsch borrows a cybernetic language which applies to political 
systems the concepts of feedback of various types, autonomy, memory, load, 
receptors, communication, and so on. The repertoire of methods and research 
strategies, and the catalogue of hypotheses and middle-range theories available 
to the researcher in comparative politics, have expanded owing to the work 
of the increasingly arge numbers of political scientists. We should not ignore 
the contributions to the discipline made by those who broadened its territorial 
scope to take in the developing area, the third world. The development 
    6) D. Easton, A System Analysis of Political Life, 1965; G. Almond and G. Powell, Com-
parative Politics, 1966; K. Deutsch, The Nerves ofGovernment, 1963. 
    7) Roberts, op. cit., pp. 13-4. 
    8) G. Almond and G. Powell, Comparative Politics: A Developmental Approach, 1966, p. 
16; G. Almond, "Comparative Political Systems", Political Development: Essays in Heuristic 
Theory, 1970, p.32; G. Almond, "Political Theory and Political Science", Political Development: 
Essays in Heuristic Theory, 1970, p. 249.
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of comparative politics owes a great debt to scholars uch as Apter, Rustow, 
Pye and the various authors of the "Princeton" volumes on "political develop-
ment". The notion of "development," which was elaborated by them, contri-
buted greatly to the progress in comparative politics.0) 
   The third phase of development in comparative politics dates only from 
about 1969. It may be characterised asthe attempt to identify and order the 
logical and scientific foundations of comparative analysis and, in doing so, to 
provide a firm base for comparative politics that is reasonably well defined 
in terms of its subject-matter, its methods, concepts and strategies. Three major 
contributions to this trend are the papers of the International Political Science 
Association Turin Round Table in 1969, especially the paper by Sartori, 
the valume of essays edited by Holt and Turner, and the book by Przeworski 
and Teune.10) A number of other contributions of a critical and polemic style 
also belong to this new period. Roberts calls this stage of the development 
of comparative politics that of "meta-politics".") 
   The purpose of this paper is to examine the recent rend, particularly the 
meta-theoretical problems in comparative politics through considering the 
arguments of Holt, Richardson, and Sartori who are called the "school of neo-
comparison" by Roberts. 
                       II 
            Logical Perfectionismof Holt and Richardson 
   Holt and Richardson propose to examine the theoretical problems in com-
parative politics from the point of view of a scientific paradigm as this concept 
has been developed by Thomas Kuhn. They assert: Although Kuhn's ideas 
developed largely from an examination of the historical development of theory 
in the natural sciences, his ideas provide an interesting and useful perspective 
    9) Roberts, op. cit., pp. 14-5. 
   10) G. Sartori, "Concept Misformation in Comparative Politics", American Political Sci-
ence Review, LXIV (December, 1970), pp. 1033-53; R. Holt and J.E. Turner (eds.), The Meth-
odology of Comparative Research, 1970; A. Prezeworski andH. Teune, The Logic of Comparative 
Social Inquiry, 1970. 
   11) Roberts, op. cit., pp. 16-7.
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from which one can look at theories in the social sciences.12) 
   According to what they say, a paradigm in its simplest terms is just "a pat-
tern or framework which gives organization and direction to a given area of sci-
entific investigation." But, to use paradigmatic concept o examine various 
approaches in the field of comparative politics, it is necessary to identify expli-
citly the following elements of a paradigm: the conceptual e ement; he theore-
tical element; the rules of interpretation; the puzzle-identifying element; the 
criteria of admissibility; and the ontologic-predictive el ment. These provide 
a set of dimensions on the basis of which the various competing paradigms in 
the field can be compared and evaluated. The five major approaches xamined 
by this set of evaluative criteria are structural-functionalism, general systems 
analysis, psychological approach, rational formal model, and atheoretical approach. 
These approaches are analysed by systematically identifying how each of the 
six elements of a paradigm is treated.' ) 
   The structural-functionalism, for one, is analyzed as follows. The most 
widely heralded and best known structural-functional p radigm in political 
science is that developed by G.A. Almond. One cannot examine the state 
of theory in comparative politics without devoting considerable attention to 
analyzing Almond's point of view. On two of the six aspects of a paradigm, 
Almond is very explicit. First, he has provided a rich and relatively ex-
haustive set of concepts in terms of which one can describe the political system. 
Political system, political structure, political function, political culture, political 
socialization, capability, and many other terms provide a rich conceptual basis 
for his paradigm. Second, Almond's paradigm is explicit in its theoretical e e-
ment.14> In The Politics of the Developing Areas, Almond stated: "The func-
tional theory of the polity which we have elaborated above does specify the 
elements of the polity in such a way as may ultimately make possible statistical 
and perhaps mathematical formulation. What we have done is to separate poli-
tical function from political structure. In other words, we have specified the 
elements of the two sets, one of functions and the other of structures, and 
have suggested that political systems may be compared in the terms of the pro-
   12) R. Holt and J.M. Richardson, Jr., "Competing Paradigms in ComparativePolitics" 
in R. Holt and J.E. Turner (eds), The Methodology f Comparative Research, 1970, p. 23. 
   13) Ibid., pp. 23-8. 
   14) Ibid., pp.33-4.
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babilities of the performance of the specified functions by the specified struc-
tures. In addition, we have specified styles of performance of function by 
structure which makes it possible for us at least to think of a state of knowledge 
of political systems in which we could make precise comparisons relating the 
elements of the three sets-functions, structures and styles-in the form of 
a series of probability statements." 15). A probabilistic heory of the polity is a 
highly commendable goal. However, as Holt and Richardson puts, consider-
able refinements will have to be made in the formulation before this laudable 
goal can be achieved. The major problems are the lack of rigorous definition 
of structure and function in general and the absence of rigorous definitions of the 
political structures in particular. The lack of clarity in the definition of basic 
concepts and a certain confusion in their logical interrelationships make it very 
difficult to determine the theoretical spects of Almond's paradigm. That is, 
we cannot identify clearly which propositions are theoretical, and thus are em-
pirically testable, and which are logical and true by definition. As the result, 
we cannot identify any puzzles in Almond's paradigm. Hence, Holt and Rich-
ardson conclude as follows. Conceptual element in Almond's paradigm is rich, 
but logically confused. This confusion makes it virtually impossible to iden-
tify the theoretical element, the puzzles, the rules of interpretation, and the 
criteria of admissibility.' ) 
   Examining the otherapproaches in the same way, Holt and Richardson 
argue that the science of comparative politics is presently in a preparadigmatic 
stage. There are a number of competing paradigms in the field, ranging from 
those that are conceptually rich but tend to be devoid of puzzles and criteria 
of admissibility, to those that concentrate largely on data and data analysis and 
are conceptually quite empty. All of the different types, however, suffer from 
a major shortcoming - they have virtually no deductive power; that is, there 
is no set of propositions from which one can deduce in a logically tight manner 
a wide range of additional propositions, ome of which can be empirically veri-
fied.l7) 
   The term theory has a variety of uses in the social sciences. A theory, 
   15) G.A. Almond and J.S. Coleman (eds.), The Politics of the Developing Areas, 1960, 
p. 59. 
   16) Holt and Richardson, p.cit., pp. 34-7. 
   17) Ibid., pp. 27 and 69-70.
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accoding to Holt and Richardson, is a deductively connected set of proposit-
ions, which are, depending on their logical position with respect to one another, 
either axioms or theorems. The axioms of a theory are a limited number of 
independent and consistent propositions that are logically prior to a much larger 
set of propositions, the theorems. In a sense we might say that the axioms 
are empirical laws whose truth is taken for granted (at least emporarily). The-
orems are deduced from the axioms and as the theorems are verified, the axioms 
tend to be confirmed.18) 
   If the "scientific theory" is defined so, most of the approaches in the field 
of comparative politics are not theoretic formulations in the strict sense, but 
nontheoretic formulations. So to speak, they are conceptual frameworks or 
conceptual schemata for comparative analysis. Accordingly, Holt and Richard-
son state: "The grand paradigms of Almond, Deutsch, Easton (and for the 
matter, Holt and Turner) are little more than heuristic schema. They present 
an interesting way of looking at political phenomena, but do little more." "What 
is needed is clear." First, a small group of theoretical primitives must be est-
ablished. Second, additional concepts must be defined, using only these the-
oretical primitives and some specifically identified logical (or mathematical) op-
erations. Third, a set of axioms must be developed using only the concepts 
and operations defined. Fourth, a set of propositions must be deduced from 
these axioms for empirical testing. Fifth, criteria of admissibility and rules of 
interpretation must be developed. "None of these steps except he first can 
be taken satisfactorily without he use of some body of rules that establish the 
principles for deduction. Our suggestion is that political scientists must turn 
to mathematics for these rules for logic and that until this is done, the grand 
schemata will remain essentially heuristic. We do not make this suggestion 
lightly. Political scientists are not known for their mathematical skills or 
interests, but we can see no other way to introduce the necessary deductive 
power into a pardigm". Furthermore, "the problem may be more difficult 
than that of simply learning certain bodies of existing mathematics." Newton's 
theoretical formulation required an invention of a new mathematics, the 
calculus. Progress in mathematical economics was blocked at the end of the 
nineteenth century because there was no mathematical way known of solving 
   18) Ibid., p. 24.
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the equations that have been formulated. Not until further advances had been 
made in pure mathematics was the way cleared for real progress. "It is not 
unlikely that the mathematics that presently exists is unsuitable for handling 
our problems, in which case the development of theory in comparative politics 
may depend upon innovative work in pure mathematics," And moreover, "The 
kind of commitment to sophistication cannot be made easily in political science. 
It is not only the formidability of mathematics that is a roadblock. The kind 
of paradigm of which we conceive is a `pure scientific' paradigm." From the 
point of view of "logical perfectionism", Holt and Richardson assert, "the 
models that are presently being employed seem to have inherent limitations 
that restrict future elaboration."~s) 
                        III 
       The Problem of Conceptnalization in Comparative Politics 
   G. Sartori points out that political science oscillates between two unsound 
extrermes concerning the theoretical and methodological problem. "At the 
one end a large majority of political scientists qualify as pure and simple uncon-
scious thinkers. At the other end a sophisticated minority qualify as overcon-
scious thinkers, in the sense that their standards ofmethod and theory are drawn 
from the physical, `paradigmatic' s iences." Moreover, "The wide gap between 
the unconscious and the overconscious thinker is concealed by the growing sop-
histication of statistical nd research techniques. Most of the literature introd-
uced by the title `Method' (in the social, behavioral or political sciences) actually 
deals with survey techniques and social statistics, and has little if anything to 
share with the crucial concern of `methodology', which is a concern with the 
logical structure and procedure of scientific enquiry." Sartori stresses that there 
is no methodology without logos, withont thinking abont thinking, in a very 
crucial sense. Methodology must be distinguished from technique. The latter 
is no substitute for the former. One may be a wonderful researcher and mani-
pulator of data, and yet remain an unconscious tkinker. According to Sartori, 
"the profession as a whole is grievously impaired by methodological unawere-
   19) Ibid., pp. 70-71.
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ness." The more we advance technically, the more we leave a vast, uncharted 
territory behind our backs. The field of comparative politics is particularly 
vulnerable to, and illustrative of, this unfelicitous tate of affairs.20) 
1. The Travelling Problem 
   Traditional typeof political science - as Sartori puts it - inherited a 
vast array of concepts which had been previously defined and refined by gener-
ations of political theorists. To some extent, therefore, the traditional political 
scientist could afford to be an "unconscious thinker." This is even more the 
case with the country-by-country legalistic institutional approach. "However, 
the new political science ngages in reconceptualization. And this is even more 
the case, necessarily, with new comparative expansion of the discipline." There 
are many reasons for "this renovatio ab imis." One is the very "expansion on 
politics." To some extent politics results objectively bigger on account of the 
fact that the world is becoming more and more politicized (more participation, 
more mobilization, and in any case more state intervention i formerly non-
governmental spheres). In no small measure, however, politics is subjectively 
bigger in that we have shifted the focus of attention both toward the periphery 
of politics (vis-a-vis the governmental process), and toward its input side. By 
now we study everything that is "pottentially political." Aside from the ex-
pansion of politics, a more specific source of conceptual nd methodological 
challenge for comparative politics is the "lengthening spectrum of political 
systems." We are now engaged in world-wide, cross-area comparisons. And 
while there is an end to geographical size, there is apparently no end to the pro-
liferation of political units. "Now, the wider the world under investigation, 
the more we need conceptual tools that are able to travel." In spite of bold 
attempts at drastic terminological innovation, it is hard to see how Western 
scholars could radically depart from the political experience of the West, i.e., 
from the vocabulary of politics which has been developed over millennia on the 
basis of such experience. "Therefore, the first question is: how far, and how, 
can we travel with the help of the available vocabulary of politics?"21) 
   Sartori charges that "we have followed (more or less unwittingly) the line 
of least resistance: broading the meaning - and thereby the range of application 
   20) G. Sartori, "Concept Misformation in Comparative Politics", AmericanPolitical Science 
Review, LXIV (December, 1970), p. 1033. 
   21) Ibid., pp. 1033-4.
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- of the conceptualizations at hand." That is to say, the larger the world, the 
more we have resorted to conceptual stretching, or conceptual straining, i.e., to 
vague amorphous conceptualizations. It may be said that conceptual stretching 
represents a deliberate attempt o make our conceptualizations value free, and 
that conceptual straining is largely a "boomerang effect" of the developing area, 
i.e., a feedback on the Western categories of the diffuse politics of the Third 
World. "These considerations notwithstanding, conceptual stretching does 
represent, in comparative politics, the line of least resistance. And the net 
result of conceptual straining is that our gains in extensional coverage t nd to be 
matched by losses in connotative precision. It appears that we can cover 
more - in travelling terms - only by saying less in a far less precise manner." 
A disciplined methodology of comparison depends on the provision of precise 
conceptualization. However, conceptual stretching would produce indefini-
teness and elusiveness. "A major drawback of the comparative expansion of 
the discipline is, then, that it has been conducive toindefiniteness, to undelimited 
and largely undefined conceptualizations." The point is that the travelling 
problem of comparative politics has been met with the poor remedy of "con-
ceptual stretching" instead of being squarely confronted.22) 
2. Quantification and Classification 
   Sartori points: What is very confusing in this matter is the abuse of a quan-
titative idiom which is nothing but an idiom. All too often, that is, we speak of 
degrees and of measurement not only without any actual measurements having 
been performed, but without any being projected, and even without any appa-
rent awareness of what must be done before such measurements can be carried 
out. For instance, in most standard textbooks one finds that nominal scales 
are spoken of as "scales of measurement." But a nominal scale is nothing 
else than a qualitative classification. To be sure classes can be given numbers; 
but this is simply a coding device for identifying items and has nothing to do 
with quantification. In a similar vein we speak more and more of "variables" 
which are not variables in any proper sense, for they are not attributes permitting 
gradations and implying measurability. No harm necessarily follows if it pleas-
es us to use the word variable as a synonym for the word concept; but we are 
only deluding ourselves if we really believe that by saying variable we have a 
   22) Ibid., pp. 1034-6.
 1976] ON THE CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR 25 
               COMPARATIVE POLITICAL ANALYSIS 
variable.23) 
   Sartori asserts that coquetting with a quantitative idiom grossly exaggerates 
the extent o which political science is currently amenable to quantification, and, 
still worse, obfuscates the very notion of quantification. To understand the 
multifaceted complexities of the notion, as he states, is "a far less simple matter." 
"Nevertheless one may usefully distinguish - in spite of the close interconnec-
tions - among three broad areas of meaning and application, that is, between 
quantification as i) measurement, ii) statistical manipulation and, iii) formal 
mathematical treatment." Generally the quantification i the first meaning 
is spoken of in political science. Its quantification consists of (a) attaching 
numerical values to items (pure and simple measurement), (b)using numbers 
to indicate the rank order of items (ordinal scales) and (c) measuring differences 
or distances among items (interval scales). The quantification i the second 
meaning, that is, statistical manipulation enters the scene only when sufficient 
numbers have been pinned on sufficient items, and becomes central to the 
discipline only when we dispose of variables which measure things that are worth 
measuring. Both conditions - and especially the latter - are hard to meet. 
As for the ultimate stage of quantification, i.e., formal mathematical treatment, 
it is a fact that we seldom, if ever, obtain isomorphic orrespondences b tween 
empirical relations among things and formal relations among numbers. "We 
may well disagree about future prospects, or as to whether it makes ense to 
construct formalized systems of quantitatively well defined relationships (mathe-
matical models) so long as we wander in a mist of qualitatively ill-defined con-
cepts." "It is for a very good reason that the progress of quantification should 
lag - in whatever discipline - behind its qualitative and conceptual progress." 
"Concept formation stands prior to quantification." In other words, "the major 
premise is that quantification e ters the scene after, and only after, having formed 
the concept. The minor premise is that the ` stuff' of quantification - the things 
underpinned by the numbers - cannot be provided by quantification itself. 
Hence the rules of concept formation are independent of, and cannot be derived 
from, the rules which govern the treatment of quantities and quantitative r la-
tions."24) 
   23) Ibid., pp. 1036-7. 
   24) Ibid., pp. 1037-8.
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   The above bears reference to the relationship between the logic of either-or 
and the logic of more-and-less, or between categoric oncepts of the either-or 
type and gradation concepts of the more-than-less-than type. "What is usually 
lost sight of is that the either-or type of logic is the very logic of classification 
building. Classes are required to be mutually exclusive, i.e., class concepts 
represent characteristics which the object under consideration must either have 
or lack. Two items being compared must belong first to the same class, and 
either have or not have an attribute; and only if they have it, the two items can 
be matched in terms of which has it more or less. Hence the logic of gradation 
belongs to the logic of classification." Proper classification ffers clear categori-
zation and thereby the basis for collecting adequately precise information. 
That is to say, the taxonomical exercise is a necessary step in the process of not 
only concept formation but also scientific inquiry. While "impatience with 
classification is totally unjustified", as Sartori puts it, "we often confuse a mere 
enumeration (or checklist) with a classification, and many so called classification 
fail to meet the minimal requirements for what they claim to be. "20 
3. Levels of Abstraction of Concepts 
   Conceptualization is served by recognition of the need for "levels of abst-
raction" of concepts, and thereby the distinctions among levels. Sartori dis-
tinguishes three levels of abstraction of concepts: high-level categories, medium-
level categories, and low-level, configurative categories. "High level categoriza-
tions obtain universal conceptualizations: whatever cannotation is sacrificed to 
the requirement of global denotation - either in space, time, or even both. 
HL concepts can also be visualized as the ultimate genus which cancels all its 
species. Descending a step, medium level categorizations fallshort of universality 
and thus can be said to obtain general classes: at this level not all differentiae re 
sacrificed to extensional requirements. Nonetheless, ML concepts are intended 
to stress imilarities at the expense of uniqueness, for at this level of abstraction 
we are typically dealing with generalizations. Finally, low level categories 
obtain specific, indeed configurative conceptualizations: here denotation is 
sacrificed to accuracy of connotation. One may equally say that with LL cate-
gories the differentiae of individual settings are stressed above their similarities: 
so much so that at this level definitions are often contextual." For example, 
   25) Ibid., pp. 1038-40.
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in the field of comparative public administration, "staff" is the high level uni-
versal category. "Administration" is still a good travelling category, but falls 
short of universal applicability in that it retains ome of the attributes associated 
with the more specific notion of "bureaucracy." Descending the ladder of 
abstration further we then find "civil service," which is qualified by its associa-
tions with the modern State. Finally, and to purse the argument all the way 
down to the low level of abstraction, a comparative study of, say, French and 
English state employees will discover their unique and distinguishing traits and 
would thus provide contextual definitions. "Clearly, there is no hard and fast 
dividing line between levels of abstraction. Borders can only be drawn very 
loosely; and the number of slices into which the ladder is divided largely depends 
on how fine one's analysis needs to be. Three slices are sufficient, however, 
for the purpose of logical analysis." According to Sartori, three levels of abst-
raction of concepts are recapitulated in the following table with respect to its 
bearing on the problems of comparative politics.26) 
                   LADDER OF ABSTRACTION27) 
 Levels of Abstraction Major Comparative Scope Logical nd Empirical                                 and Purpose Properties ofConcepts
 High Level Categories Cross-area comparisons among Maximal extension, Minimal in-
 Universal conceptuali- heterogeneous c ntexts (global tension, Definition by negation 
 zation theory) 
 Medium Level Catego- Intra-area comparisons among Balance of denotation with con-
 ries, General conceptua- relatively homogeneous c ntexts notation, Definition by analysis, 
 lizations and taxonomies (middle range theory) i.e. per genus et differentiam 
 Low Level Categories Country by country analysis Maximal intension, Minimal ex-
 Configurative concep- (narrow-gauge theory) tension, Contextual definition 
 tualizations 
   Sartori asserts that "the ladder of abstraction scheme brings out the snares 
and the faults of our current way of handling the travelling problem of compa-
rative politics." For example, he takes up the conceptualization of strutural-
functionalism. In The Politics of the Developing Areas, Almond argued: 
"What we have done is to separate political function from political structure.' ' 26) 
   26) Ibid., pp. 1041-3. 
   27) Ibid., p. 1044. 
   28) G. Almond and J.S. Coleman (eds.), The Politics ofthe Developing Areas, 1960, p.59.
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This separation is indeed crucial. But ten years have gone by and the assign-
ment remains largely unfulfilled. Indeed, the structural-functional school 
is still grappling - with clear symptoms of frustration - with the preliminary 
difficulty of defining "function" - both taken by itself and in its relation to 
"structure". Generally, the structural and functional categories lack adequate 
underpinning. And moreover, Sartori points out that "the stalemate and the 
mishandlings of the structural-functional approach ave a lot to do with the 
ladder of abstraction." On the functional side of the coin we are encumbered 
by a wealth of haphazard functional categories which are merely enumerated, 
and definitely provide no clues as to the level and type of analysis to which they 
apply. As a result the global functional argument developed by a number of 
structural-functionalists remains uspended in mid-air - for lack of a coordi-
nated medium level taxonomic support - and is left to play with overstretched, 
if not contentless, functional universals. On the structural side of the coin we 
are confronted, instead, with little more than nothing. Structures qualified 
on their own right hardly exist - at least in the Almond line of thinking. This 
is all the more regrettable in view of the fact that while functions are meant o 
be (at least in global comparative politics) broad explanatory categories which 
do not require a low level specification, structures bear, instead, a closer elation 
to observables, and definitely need under-pinning all the way down the ladder. 
With structures understood as organizational structures we are required, in 
fact, to descend the ladder all the way down to low level configurative-descrip-
tive accounts. In summing up, "not only has the structural-functional scholar 
ignored the ladder of abstraction, but he has inadvertently destroyed, during 
his reckless climbing, his own ladder. So much so that the approach encounters 
exactly the same perplexity as, say, general systems theory, namely, `Why has 
no scholar succeeded in presenting a structural-functional formulation which 
meets the requirements of empirical analysis.' Now, it is hardly surprising that 
the general systems theorist should encounter great difficulties in deriving testa-
ble propositions about politics, since he is required to proceed eductively on 
the basis of theortical primitives. But this is not the case with the structural-
functional approach, which is not necessarily committed to whole systems analy-
sis and enjoys the distinctive mpirical advantage of leaning extensively - espe-
cially with segmented systems analysis - on observational terms. So, why 
should the structural-functional scholar remain tied to "a level of analysis
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which [does] not permit empirical testing?" According to Sartori's diagnosis, 
"there is no intrinsic reason for this. Quite to the contrary, we may expect 
very rewarding returns, and the empirical promise (and distinctiveness) of the 
approach may well near fulfillment, if we only learn how to maneuver along a 
ladder of abstraction.' '29) 
   Hence Sartori claims: Rearranging the conceptual framework of com-
parative analysis, we should confront squarely, tackle in earnest and solve 
-on adequate understanding of the ladder (and levels) of abstraction-
the problems of re-conceptualization instead of following the line of least resis-
tance such as "conceptual stretching." What is needed, for him, is (1) to devel-
op the discipline along a medium level of abstraction with better intermediate 
categories, and (2) to maneuver, both upwards and downwards, along a ladder 
of abstraction i such a way as to bring together assimilation and differentiation, 
a relatively high explanatory power and a relatively precise descriptive content, 
macro-theory and empirical testing. So Sartori is against he view of logical 
perfectionism that is argued by Holt and Richardson. He states: "I have taken 
the more sober, and indeed counter-perfectionistic view that we should not 
encourage the 'overconscious thinker' paralyzed by overly ambitious tandards. 
But surely we cannot expect an unconscious thinker lacking elementary logical 
training and discipline to meet the intricate new problems arising from global 
comparison." Accordingly, he calls upon "the conscious thinker to steer a mid-
dle cause between crude logical mishandling on the one hand, and logical per-
fectionism (and paralysis) on the other hand."3o) 
                      IV
          The Scientific Foundationsof Comparative Analysis 
   The claim for rearranging the conceptual device in comparative politics 
gives rise to not only the need for overall re-conceptualization but also the 
necessity of re-examining the methodological foundations of the discipline. 
The importance and difficulty of these problems facing the field, as Yoshinori Ide 
   29) G. Sartori, op. cit., pp. 1046-50. 
   30) Ibid., pp. 1052-3 and 1033.
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points out,31) lies in the paradoxical character. While contemporary students 
of comparative politics have poured most of their energies into establishing the 
positive and scientific method of comparative political analysis, it is said today 
that the established method is non-positive, non-scientific, and thereby non-
comparative. Here we find the paradoxical charater of current matters in the 
field. However, that is not all. As we have more strongly the methodological 
orientation toward "pure scientific precision" by coming to be conscious of the-
oretical and methodological matters, we encounter the other - contextually 
distinct - paradoxical nd problematic aspects which are relevant to the mean-
ing of the theory and method. Then we have the following problems. (1) 
The better we arrange conceptual tools for comparative analysis and refine the 
theoretical models, the larger the distance between objects (or substance) and 
theoretical models becomes. Thus, the necessity for re-considering fundamental-
ly the meaning of "positive charcter" of the positive approach and theoretical 
models have arisen. The problem is what we call "alienating from substance." 
(2) There is the problem relevant to re-discovering the normative values. (3) 
In relation to the above, the problems have arisen as to renewing our understand-
ing of present situations of Western states. So an interest in the Western has 
been recalled by rising of comparative political development, and thereby an 
attempt to bridge the gap between the Western and the non-Western has ap-
peared. Hence, it has been claimed that we shoud consider enewedly the 
conditions and issues confronting Western countries. Moreover, we have 
had arguments of attempting comparative studies of "the third world" rather 
within than without the Western. It is generally said that comparative govern-
ment functions for the better understanding not only of foreign governments 
but also of one's own. Accordingly, it is considered that the recent trend 
wherein we are converging our interest upon the "within" is a natural result of 
such working of comparative political studies. The trend, however, comes to 
raise the complicated problem concerning the relevance of comparative political 
analysis. That is to say, the above, in the deeper context, bears reference 
to the philosophical nd methodological foundations of comparative analysis. 
Thus, things have come to a serious pass. We have to establish speedily the 
   31) Yoshinori Ide, "Comparative Politics and Administration: Movement, Development 
and Paradox", Nihon Seiji Gakkai Nenpo (The Annual of The Japanese Political Science Asso-
ciation), 1971.
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scientific method of comparative political analysis, but, on the other hand, 
we should re-consider the relevance of comparative method, and re-examine 
the philosophical foundations of the scientific method. Here appears concen-
tratively the paradoxical character of the methodological issue which the field 
of comparative politics is confronting with. 32) 
   Furthermore, we can find the same paradoxy in the contemporary political 
science as a whole. This relates to the recent issue in American political 
science concerning the behavioralism and post-behavioralism.33) On the essential 
character of the issue facing the discipline, E.F. Miller34) insists: "Recent 
controversy in American political science about the nature of political inquiry 
reflects an older and deeper conflict at the level of epistemology between rival 
theories of knowledge." Nevertheless, D. Easton sees the difference between 
behavioralism and the viewpoint of its most recent critics as one more of mood 
or emphasis than of principle. So Easton seems to argue that it will be pos-
sible to harmonize behavioralism with post-behavioralism. However, accord-
ing to Miller, "the recent antibehavioral protest stands in fundamental opposi-
tion not only to the approach that behavioralism takes to political inquiry but 
also to its basic assumptions about the nature of human knowledge." Post-
behavioralism represents "something deeper and more durable than a desire 
for greater attention to practical issues or a commitment to radical politics." 
The post-behavioral revolution "gains depth and signification from its repudia-
tion of the positivistic theory of knowledge on which behavioralism rests and its 
attachment to epistemological principles that have gained ascendancy over posi-
tivism in contemporary thought. Easton sees that 'postbehavioralism' is quite 
different in nature from the currents of opposition to behavioralism that had 
developed in the decade or so before 1965, which he calls `classicism' and 
'tradionalism.' He fails to recognize, however, that it rests on distinctive 
epistemological presuppositions which place it in fundamental opposition not 
only to behavioralism's earlier opponents but also to behavioralism itself.' '35) 
   32) Ibid., pp. 244-8. 
   33) See DavidEaston, "The New Revolution in Political Science", American Political 
Science Review, Vol. LXIII (December, 1969), pp. 1051-1061. 
   34) E.F. Miller, "Positivism, Historicism, and Political Inquiry", and "Rejoinder to 'Com-
ments' by David Braybrooke and Alexander Rosenberg, Richard S. Rudner and Martin Landau", 
American Political Science Review, Vol. LXI (September, 1972), pp. 796-817, and 857-73. 
   35) Ibid., pp. 796 and 857.
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   Miller points out that the recent challenge called "post-behavioral evolution" 
is under the influence of "historicism"36) which, as a theory of knowledge, 
typically contradicts positivism. Thus, Miller proposes to examine the recent 
debate about the nature of political inquiry in light of the deeper conflict in 
epistemology, now almost a century old, between positivism and its principal foe, 
namely, historicism. According to Miller, there are four sources of historicist 
influence which seem particularly important in the point of their impact on 
American political science: (1) antipositivist writings in the philosophy and 
history of science; (2) writings in the sociology of knowledge that adopt the 
position of Karl Mannheim; (3) recent work in existential phenomenology; 
and (4) the thought of Friedrich Nietzsche.31) 
   Here I consider the problemsraised by the political scientist who stands 
on the first, i.e., antipositivist position which is directly relevant to the above-
mentioned context of this section. Agreeing enerally with the epistemological 
view of such antipositivists a  T. Kuhn and N.R. Hanson, John Gunnell ques-
tions several features of the positivist conception of science, particularly its 
deductive model of explanation. First of all, he points out, "there is a signi-
ficant intellectual lag or gulf between political science and contemporary work 
in the philosophy of science." Generally speaking, social sciences of today have 
the same relations with the philosophy of the social sciences. "The current 
relationship between social science and the philosophy of science (or the philo-
sophy of the social sciences) is a curious one. Despite the emergence of consi-
derable body of literature in philosophy which is pertinent to the methodological 
problems of social science, there has been a lack of ostensive ties between the 
   36) The term "historicism" has been given avariety of meanings. Miller uses theterm 
in the wide sense, i.e., in an epistemological sense tothe view that all human knowledge is essen-
tially relative to time and place. He states: This seems tohave been the principal meaning of the 
term since the great debate about historicism in Germany in the early decades of the twentieth 
century. (Ibid., p. 797.) 
   37) Ibid., pp.797, 806. Miller sees that he following writings stand on the first position: 
J. Gunnel, "Deduction, Explanation, andSocial Scientific Inquiry", American Political Science 
Review, Vol. LXIII (December, 1969); S. Wolin, "Political Theory as a Vocation", American 
Political Science Review, Vol. LXIII (December, 1969). About he second position: W.E. 
Connolly, Political Science and Ideology, 1967. About he third position: M. Surkin, "Sense 
and Non-sense in Politics" in An End to Political Science, ed. M. Surkin and A. Wolfe, 1970; 
H.Y. Jung, "The Political Relevance of Existential Phenomenology", Review ofPolitics, 33 (Oc-
tober, 1971). And about the fourth position: H.Kariel, "Nietzsche's Preface toConstitutiona-
lism", Journal of Politics, Vol. 25 (May, 1963).
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two areas." Especially, it is considered that the situation of political science 
is a serious pass. Contemporary political scientists, or political behavioralists 
have turned to the philosophy of science for guidance in the area of substantive 
research. However, the ideas on which they draw have been obsolete or obso-
lescent within the discipline of the philosophy of science itself, both as descrip-
tions and standards of scientific inquiry. They have, to a large extent, derived 
their conception of science and their notion of the procedural rules of empirical 
inquiry from a ristricted body of literature in the philosophy of science, namely, 
"traditional logical empiricism" which is now being soundly attacked within the 
philosophy of science itself. Thus, they are faced with the problem of a form 
of cultural ag.38) 
   Concerning the lag between current work in the philosophy of science and 
political scientists' perceptions of that field, Miller also states: "In justifying 
their particular conception of science, advocates of behavioral approach ave 
commonly invoked the authority of the philosophy of science. They have 
assumed - and a generation of political scientists has been taught o believe -
that there exists within the philosophy of science a consensus favoring a positi-
vistic conception of scientific inquiry. We have seen, however, that there is 
a basic conflict about he nature of science within the philosophy of science itself, 
arising from the broader dispute at the level of epistemology about he character 
of human knowledge. Ironically, a revolt against positivism was beginning in 
the philosophy of science at about the time that political scientists were adopting 
the positivistic model of scientific inquiry as the basis for their own revolution. By 
the time the behavioral revolution had reached its objective, the shape of things 
in the philosophy of science had changed ramatically. Nevertheless, the meth-
odological literature in political science continues to treat the positivistic model 
as though it enjoyed the full endorsement of philosophers ofscience. The wri-
ting of such men as Kuhn and Hanson are, in fact, often cited in support of the 
behavioralist's program, with little apparent recognition of the extent o which 
their views jeopardize the very foundations of behavioralism."39) 
   38) J. Gunnel, "Deduction, Explanation, a d SocialScientific Inquiry"; "Science and the 
Philosophy of Science: A Rejoinder to Proffessors Goldberg and Gregor", American Political 
Science R view, Vol. LXIII (December, 1969), pp. 1233 and 1259. See also J. Gunnel, "The 
Idea of the Conceptual Framework: A Philosophical Critique", Journal of Comparative Administ-
ration, 1 (August 1969), p.142. 
   39) E.F. Miller, op. cit., p. 807.
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     Aside from the problem of the cultural ag, Gunnell analyzes criticallythe 
 postivist conception of science and its deductive model of explanation. "Much 
 of the theoretical literature in political and social science, as well as attempts o 
 explicate the epistemic features of social scientific investigation, rest on a belief 
 that the activity of the natural scientist is an appropriate model for understanding 
 and prescribing the role of the social scientist. Althongh it may be granted that 
 social and natural science must be distinguished in terms of such charateristics 
 as technique and subject matter, this is often understood as explaining certain 
 inherent or temporary limitations of social science. Generally it has been assu-
 med that with regard to the logic of explanation, social science must be funda-
 mentally symmetrical with natural science if it is to count as science." And 
 moreover, it has been argued that the Hempelian model of scientific explanation 
 is "an authoritative r presentation f the nature of science in general, a guide 
  to substantive empirical inquiry in social science, and a formal measure of adequ-
 ate explanation." That is to say, the thesis of the Hempelian deductivism or 
 logical empiricism is most fundamentally "an argument for the "methodological 
 unity of all empirical science since it attempts to reduce the criteria of scientific 
  explanation to one universal logical pattern. "4°) 
     The deductive model, Gunnell charges,does not actually reflect he chara-
 cter of scientific explanation. "What must be clearly understood is that the 
 deductive model is expressly not intended to reflect he manner in which wor-
 king scientists actually formulate their explanatory accounts. Although it is 
 offered as an explication of the logical structure and rationale of various ways 
 in which empirical science answers explanation-seeking why-questions, it is a 
 philosophical thesis and not an empirical claim." "The model principally pro-
 vides a set of formal logical criteria which are timeless and placeless andstate 
 what any explanation must include to truly count as a scientific explanation, 
 i.e., a philosophic demand is being put upon explanation - a demand that the 
 cohesion of its components should not depend upon the background of the per-
 son who asks for the explanation, or upon the context in which it is given, but 
M' upon. relations which are, so to speaking, intrinsic to explanation. And 
 the essence of the demand is simply that what is to be explained must be strictly 
 deducible from a law to count as a fully adequate xplanation. Whether the 
     40) J. Gunnell, "Deduction, Explanation, a d Social Science Inquiry", pp. 1233,1236, 
  and 1259.
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content of explanations in any branch of science in fact does, or conceivably 
can, coincide with this meta-scientific reconstruction is considered irrelevant 
as far as judging the validity of the model, and there is no claim whatever 
concerning the extent o which scientific explanations can actually be achieved 
for the phenomena studied in different branches of scientific inquiry. In other 
words, there is no necessary coincidence between science and scientific expla-
nation." In short, the model has been "the artifact of the philosopher ofscience 
rather than the actual practice of scientists." From this viewpoint, the dedu-
ctive model is not considered as an accurate represntation f the actual ogic of 
inquiry in natural science. And even if this logic were accurate insofar as natu-
ral science is concerned, as Gunnell puts it, there would be no basis for insisting 
that social science should conform to it. The canons of scientific inquiry for 
a particular field must be determined by scientists who work in that field and 
not by some outside authority. It is science and not philosophy which establish-
es the criteria for adequate xplanation and rules for developing such criteria. 
Gunnell emphasizes that "the specification of the criteria of acceptable social 
scientific explanation belongs to social science." That is to say, the formal or 
substantive meaning of explanation and the objective or inter-subjective stand-
ards in science are always relative to particular scientific ontexts (or pardigms). 
Neither the meaning nor the standards can be discussed apart from particular 
contexts. The adequate standards in any field at any time is contextually de-
termined. So he advocates the "contextualist approach" as an approach to 
the philosophy of science (and the philosophy of the social sciences). And 
regarding the proper approach to political inquiry, he asserts to replace the 
behavioral pproach with one that draws from the insights of Max Weber, the 
later Wittgenstein, and phenomenologists uch as Alfred Schujz.41) 
   Thus, as Gunnell puts it, "consideration f the deductive model" provides 
"a vehicle for examining certain more general problems about explanation and 
the relationship between social science and the philosophy of science. Since 
social scientists and especially political scientists, have been influenced either 
directly or indirectly, by the deductive model and other aspects of the philosop-
hy of logical empiricism from which it emanates, there is not only the obvious 
   41) Ibid., pp. 1234, 1237-8, 1246, and 1259-60. Also Gunnell, "Social Science and Poli-
tical Reality: The Problem ofExplanation", Social Research; 35 (Spring, 1968), p.180.
 36 OSAKA UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [No. 23 
question whether social scientists have correctly understood this construct and 
this school of thought but the question of the validity of logical empiricism, 
even if correctly understood, as an approach to the philosophy of science (and 
social science)." As Gunnell notes, it is necessary to realize that "logical em-
piricism has been concerned with developing formal representations or reconst-
ructions of the logical structure of scientific explanation and with a meta-logical 
analysis of the language applied to science." Being engrossed in the abstract 
and formalistic work of logical analysis, that is, in the formalism isolated with 
actual scientific practice, logical empiricism as an approach to the philosophy 
of science has been challenged severely by recent works of antipositivists within 
the field. Furthermore, "this recent literature is marked by its empirical orien-
tation, i.e., its attention to actual scientific practice and especially the history of 
science." 42) 
   What Gunnell has argued above suggests that there is not only the new 
trend against positivism in the philosophy of science but also the trend of 
re-examining radicaly philosophical foundations of the theory and method in 
political science, from the antipositivist position. 
V 
                           Conclusion 
   In regard to a catalytic role of comparative politics, Almond proudly says: 
"It has been the great privilege of the sub-discipline of comparative politics to 
have acted as a catalyst in this process of proffessional development." Con-
fronted by the exotic and unstable phenomena of the new and modernizing 
nations, it was uniquely challenged by the problems of comparison, classifica-
tion, and change, and led in the search for analytical frameworks and categories 
suitable for coping with these intellectual problems. It is not accidental that 
it fell to comparative politics to be particulary active in reestablishing the re-
lationship between the analysis of individual political systems and their classes 
and varieties with general political theory, and that it dramatized the necessity 
of reforging the links between historical political theory, empirical political 
   42) Gunnell, "Deduction, Explanation, a d Social Science Inquiry", pp. 1234and 1238.
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theory, and normative political theory." And he furthermore states as follows. 
"Comparison" is "the very essense of the scientific method." Accordingly, 
"it makes no sense to speak of a comparative politics in political science
, since 
if it is a science, it goes without saying that it is comparative in its approach."4s) 
   Ironically, at this time that comparative politics has grown into such great 
ones, the field has come to confront the serious problems of re-considering the 
meaning of comparative analysis and of re-examining the philosophical founda-
tions of the scientific method. So it can be said that whether comparative 
politics as a sub-discipline in contemporary political science will play the catalytic 
role hereafter depends upon the extent to which the problems may be re-con-
sidered and re-examined thoroughly. 
   43) G. Almond, "Political Theory and Political Science" in Political Development: Essays 
in Heuristic Theory, 1970, pp. 253-4.
